The merger in 2009 between China Eastern Airlines and Shanghai Airlines came at a time when both airlines were suffering heavy losses, and were struggling for survival during the global financial crisis. An examination of the prices on China Eastern's seven domestic Shanghai-based routes suggests that on average fares on departure days have increased by 
Introduction
China's airline industry in the past decade has been characterised by a series of merger events. In 2002 China's nine state-owned airlines merged into three airline groups: the Air China Group, the China Eastern Group and the China Southern Group. The China Eastern Group comprised China Eastern Airlines (hereafter China Eastern), China Yunnan Airlines and China Northwest Airlines. In 2009 China Eastern and Shanghai Airlines, two Shanghaibased competitors, became one under the umbrella of the China Eastern Group. Previous studies on airlines mergers have largely focused on the US market. For example, the effects of the 1980s mergers that took place in the US airline market have been well studied by Borenstein (1990) , Werden et al. (1991) , Kim and Singal (1993) , Morrison (1996 ), Peters (2006 , and Kwoka and Shumilkina (2010) . In general, market power has been detected following the mergers, especially when the merging firms had overlapping routes or if one party provided services and the other was a potential entrant.
The decline in airline company mergers during the 1990s resulted in few empirical studies in the US for that period. The price effects of a recent merger between Delta Airlines and Northwest Airlines were examined by Luo (2014) whose findings suggest that the merger generated only small increases in fares. The author claims that the merger between legacy carriers has a weak effect on fares, while changes in low cost carriers (LCCs) have a much greater impact on fares. Studies on airline mergers outside the US are rare even though numerous mergers have occurred in the last decade. Dobson and Piga (2011) have examined the mergers between LCCs in the European market and suggest that efficiency and consumer benefits can be realised quickly and so the takeovers have a net beneficial effect for consumers, at least in price terms.
Antitrust policy towards horizontal mergers is largely prospective even in the US. Ashenfelter and Hosken (2010) have called for more retrospective studies on the price effects of consummated mergers to improve future antitrust decision-making. Studies on mergers are particularly important in China because its merger control agency was established as recently as 2008 and not only has it had little experience in dealing with airline mergers but it also needs empirical evidence to improve the quality of its decision-making.
The second section of this paper provides the background of the two Shanghai-based airlines, and reviews the financial performance of China Eastern before and after the 2009 merger.
Section 3 presents the data and methodology used in detecting market power that China 3 Eastern may have acquired after merging with Shanghai Airlines. Section 4 discusses the findings and their implications. The last section concludes the paper.
Background
China Eastern was one of six trunk airlines that separated from the Civil Aviation Airlines was a longstanding rival of China Eastern. Their routes to and from Shanghai overlapped on almost all of the important domestic and some short-haul international ones.
The two companies had a tension-filled relationship and price wars between them were frequent. Until the late 1990s, China Eastern did not accept tickets issued by Shanghai Airlines nor did it take passengers transferred from Shanghai Airlines in times of flight delay or cancelation.
The price effects of China's 2002 airline mergers were examined by Zhang and Round (2009) and Zhang (2012) : the 2002 airline consolidation did not confer China Eastern with any significant market power in either the short or long term. These studies have found that in the years following the mergers, competition in the markets associated with Shanghai remained strong because Shanghai is China's largest commercial city and the routes in and out of Shanghai are a significant source of revenue for many domestic airlines. The airline companies continually increased flight frequencies and launched new routes to and from this city. As a result, price wars broke out regularly. This was one of the reasons for China Although China Eastern has been partly privatised, its parent company, China Eastern Holdings that represents the state, has absolute control over it by holding about 60% of the equity. When China has been transitioning to a market economy from an unresponsive planned economy in the last three decades, reforms in the air transport sector were slow and limited. China Eastern performed relatively better than other airlines and enjoyed a high degree of autonomy before the 2002 consolidation. Its then parent company was in very small 4 scale and did not interfere much in the internal affairs. However, the 2002 consolidation created a new parent company for China Eastern, almost 10 times larger than before in terms of the number of managers and employees. The new parent company operated in an oldfashioned style and closely supervised China Eastern's day-to-day operations, insensitive to market changes and macroeconomic variables. Because of the lack of freedom and flexibility, China Eastern did not put much effort in developing new markets, improving customer services and addressing the needs of employees, which might be the fundamental reason for the financial losses. shown that horizontal mergers on average are not associated with higher profitability (see, for example, Jacquemin and Slade 1989) . However, many poorly run firms still choose to be taken over to avoid bankruptcy, probably because the cost of merging is less than the cost of bankruptcy (Shrieves and Stevens 1979) . For China Eastern, the merger with another weak airline was not ideal, but in the absence of finding a stronger partner, this move at least eliminated a close rival, thereby avoiding head-to-head competition on most of the routes in and out of Shanghai. and 55%, respectively, from 2009 to 2010. There was also an impressive improvement in both passenger and cargo load factors, the former rising from 72% to around 78% while the latter increasing from 50% to 60%. China Eastern's annual report credited the increases to strong traffic demand due to China's fast growing economy, the Shanghai World Expo and synergies gained through its merger with Shanghai Airlines. For example, the 2009 merger enabled China Eastern to optimise its network connectivity with increased capacity at Shanghai's two airports. New routes were launched, frequencies were increased, schedules were coordinated and the right flight time concept was introduced, thereby providing more choices for international and domestic passengers.
Internal reforms were also started in an attempt to restore employees' confidence and trust in the company's leadership and to increase their sense of participation. Since 2009 China Eastern has retired 183 middle-and top-level managers and has created 103 senior management job positions for internal candidates.
Although all these moves may have contributed to China Eastern's strong performance in profit in 2010, it should be acknowledged that most benefits of the merger may take years to realise, especially the expected cost savings. Merkert and Morrell (2012) have argued that it is only long after the transaction has occurred that some of the uncertainties involved with merger activities may become clearer. Therefore, this study hypothesises that the fundamental reason for the record profit is the elimination of direct competition which allowed China Eastern to charge higher prices. The following sections will use the departure day fare data to examine this hypothesis.
Data and methodology
The fare data were collected from the largest ticketing agency at Shanghai's two airports.
More than 80% of the passengers who purchase tickets from their counters fly out on the same day according to the ticketing agency's daily sales reports. Therefore, the fare can be regarded as the departure day price. The agency's monthly statistics report the daily sales revenue excluding airport taxes and fuel surcharges, and the number of tickets sold for China Eastern.
1 Thus, the average price for a particular day can be calculated. Business or first class fares in the daily sales revenue are removed from the data. Therefore, the final fare data represent China Eastern's one-way daily economy class price (with or without discount). The Following previous literature such as Morrison and Winston (1995) The endogeneity problem has long been recognised as being associated with the regression of price on concentration variables such as market share. However, in reality, finding good instruments is difficult. Kwoka and Shumilkina (2010) show that any possible endogeneity associated with the concentration variable does not greatly affect their results. Gayle and Wu (2013) demonstrate that the endogeneity problem associated with market structure is likely to 8 be small. Brueckner et al. (2013) also argue that bias from the potential endogeneity of the competition variables is not a major concern in their study.
Since the emergence of the hub-and-spoke system following air transport deregulation in the US, the price charged by hub airports has been much debated (Borenstein 1989; Lee and Luengo-Prado 2005) . However, as part of the 'hub premium' debate, Tretheway and Kincaid (2005) have reported that more recent papers have found the magnitude of the hub dominance impact to be very minimal, and other factors such as the presence of LCCs are more influential on the higher fares paid at concentrated hubs. In addition, we have included the route market share variable, which is closely associated with the airport dominance variable. Therefore, the airport dominance variable will not enter into our models. In addition to using a merger dummy in the regression model to detect market power, we also calculate the monthly Lerner index proposed by Lerner (1934) The Lerner index (L) is defined as:
where P is the price charged by the carrier on a given route while MC is the route-specific marginal cost.
Owing to the unavailability of the cost data, we follow the methodology proposed by Zhang (1990, 1993) , and subsequently used in Zhang et al. (2013) , and Zhang et al.
(2014) to approximate the route-specific marginal cost:
where D k is the distance of route k, AFL t is the average distance flown by the airline, cpk t is the cost per passenger-kilometre in period t, and θ is an unknown parameter ranging from 0 to 1. Zhang et al. (2014) estimate the value of θ using the data from China's airline industry and suggest that θ is around 0.4, a value that is very close to those reported in Oum et al. (1993) and Murakami (2011) . China Eastern's annual financial reports can be used to gather relevant data to calculate cpk t and AFL t .
Results and discussion
Tables 3 and 4 present the estimation results from the regression models. Table 3 clearly shows that the 2009 merger has conferred China Eastern with significant market power, given that on average there was a 22% increase in fares as indicated by all three models. The random effects and FGLS approaches suggest that the prices rose by about 8% during the Shanghai World Expo period. Not surprisingly, the third quarter experiences higher fares than the first quarter as this is the holiday season for students and teachers who usually travel around with their families during this time. The fixed effects model does not show any significant effects of other variables when the robust standard errors are reported. The other two models reveal a negative relationship between market share and the fares. This is consistent with the finding by Evans and Kessides (1993) and Lee and Luengo-Prado (2005) , who report a weak relationship between route concentration and fares, suggesting that routelevel dominance does not confer much market power to the airlines. Unsurprisingly, long distance is associated with higher fares as operating on longer routes is more costly.
Interestingly, the presence of a LCC, Spring Airlines, does not show an effect of suppressing the fares charged by China Eastern in the fixed effects model. The negative effect of the LCC reported by the FGLS model is also small in magnitude. This may be explained by the fare data used in this research: that is, the departure day prices of China Eastern would not be suppressed by the presence of a LCC. ***significant at 1%, **significant at 5%, *significant at 10%.
It can be seen from Table 4 As a result, a significant increase in marginal cost in 2010 has been observed on all the seven routes in our calculation using Equation (2). In the antitrust analysis of airline consolidation, it is necessary to distinguish between complementary and parallel mergers or alliances, as identified by Oum et al. (1996) and Park (1997) . Park et al. (2001) claim that a complementary alliance enables partners to attract more passengers by improving their connecting services and decreasing fares for connecting services. New demands are thus created, or are taken from the existing connecting passengers of rival airlines. In contrast, parallel alliances were likely to decrease total output and increase fares, possibly because of the changed pro-collusive market conditions. The appeal of mergers and of airline alliances is much the same for an airline. In fact, Zhang and Zhang (2006) note that strategic alliances might be viewed as a lesser form of a merger. Therefore, the concepts of complementary and parallel could be applied in merger analysis. Unlike the 2002 merger where the networks of the merging airlines were largely complementary (Zhang 2008) , the merger between China Eastern and Shanghai Airlines in 2009 was a parallel merger, which was the key factor that led to substantial price increase and unprecedented profit in 2010. ***significant at 1%, **significant at 5%, *significant at 10%. It is worth noting that despite the significant increase in prices, the change in social welfare after a merger is uncertain when the benefits to the airlines and to consumers are considered, especially given that the two airlines were financially unviable before the 2009 merger.
These days most economists agree that the eventual goal of competition policy should be to increase efficiency, i.e., to maximise the sum of consumer surplus and producer surplus.
Under this goal, the overall benefits including the interests of consumers, producers, resource owners, shareholders and other stakeholders will be considered. This might be one possible reason why China's antitrust authorities did not impose any condition on this parallel merger in 2009.
In addition, the merger may increase the merging airlines' ability to offer greater product differentiation, especially for the price-insensitive business passengers, who prefer faster connections and place high value on flight punctuality and frequency of service. Paying a higher price does not necessarily represent a loss of consumer welfare for them. We cannot exclude the possibility that China Eastern well understands that most late bookers are business travellers and the 2009 merger has increased its confidence of charging higher prices without worrying about losing customers. However, China Eastern needs to know that this is only sustainable if higher quality services are consistently delivered and customers are convinced that these services are worthwhile.
Concluding remarks
Previous studies have suggested that the 2002 airline consolidation did not lead to China
Eastern charging higher prices, largely due to the complementary nature of this consolidation. This research study has extended the existing airline merger literature in several ways. First, typically when firms begin merger talks at least one firm is financially sound and the merger is expected to build a bright future for the firms. However, before beginning their negotiations both China Eastern and Shanghai Airlines were financially distressed and relied on government subsidies. This special case has not been examined before.
Second, it is well-known that most airlines use an intertemporal pricing strategy and charge higher prices for consumers (usually business travellers) who book close to their flight's departure. The use of departure day prices in this paper complements existing studies that usually use average prices. The findings will have important implications to business passengers who usually do not book their flights well in advance.
Third, although in theory an anticompetitive effect is highly possible on parallel routes where allied or merged airlines operate, most of the empirical evidence suggests that fares charged by allied or merged carriers do not significantly differ from those charged by non-aligned carriers on similar routes because the upward impact on fares due to the cooperation effect tends to be offset by the downward effect from density economies (Dresner 2011 ). The present research, however, has revealed significant increase in fares following a 'parallel' merger, which reminds regulatory authorities to remain vigilant in handling airline mergers when numerous parallel routes are involved. Clearly a pre-merger analysis should be conducted by the antitrust authorities and stringent conditions could be imposed on the merged parties when a proposed merger is likely to result in substantial lessening of or significant impediment to effective competition. For example, Shanghai's Hongqiao and Pudong airports are notoriously congested and it has been extremely difficult for new airlines to obtain an ideal time slot. The regulatory authorities could have required China Eastern and Shanghai Airlines to give up some of their slots at the two airports, and released them to the private carriers that emerged in the last few years. New route licences could also be issued to encourage new operators to compete directly with China Eastern on business routes where market power is more likely to exist as suggested by this study.
